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An Investigation into
the Effect of
“Going Concern”
Qualifications on the
Stock Market
By Betty C. Brown and Alan S. Levitan

The auditor’s responsibility when a
firm’s continued existence is in ques
tion was addressed in Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 34. Although
SAS No. 34 attempts to establish
some general guidelines for the audi
tor to consider in formulating his opin
ion, it does not offer any specific
criteria for the auditor to follow. On the
contrary, SAS No. 34 refers to the sub
jectiveness of the auditor’s opinion.
Identifying the point at which uncer
tainties about recoverability, classifica
tions, and amounts require the auditor
to modify his report is a complex pro
fessional judgment. No single factor or
combination of factors is controlling.1

After having accumulated all rele
vant information, the auditor must rely
upon his/her own judgment of the
materiality of the difficulties. He/she
must ultimately determine the extent
of disclosure required. If the auditor
cannot assuage his/her doubts about
continuity, some sort of qualification or
disclosure is appropriate. First, how
ever, the auditor will do all that is
reasonable to eliminate these doubts,
usually relying upon evidence that is
persuasive rather than convincing.
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Without clearly stated criteria, different
auditors might issue different reports
on the same firm. It is possible that a
“going concern’’ exception is a selffulfilling prophecy: firms that otherwise
might succeed, could fail because of
the auditor’s report.
Given the possibility that the audi
tors’ report may contribute to a firm’s
failure, it is difficult to test the superi
ority of the auditor’s ability to predict
failure over the investor’s ability to
predict failure, using only market data.
Nonetheless, auditors are forced into
the position of “predicting.’’ Moreover,
it is asserted that auditors have ac
cess to certain “qualitative’’ (as well
as additional quantitative) data that
are not contained in the financial state
ments. Assuming that the market is
efficient in the semi-strong form, these
“qualitative” data that are not publicly
available should be the only factor
separating the auditor’s predictive
ability from the investor’s predictive
ability.
As an alternative to the “going con
cern” qualification, these “qualitative”
characteristics could be disclosed in
the financial statements. It appears
appropriate, therefore, to question the
influence of the auditors’ report on the

behavior of investors. If investors react
to a qualified opinion, it may be con
cluded that they perceive the report to
contain information. If they do not, all
the concern about self-fulfilling pro
phecies would be moot. It must be
determined whether the report is per
ceived to contain information before it
can be decided if there is a better way
of conveying that information.
This study investigates the relation
ship of going concern qualifications to
security price behavior. Because the
auditor’s report is an integral part of
the financial statements, it is
necessary to separate the effect of the
auditor’s report from the effect of the
financial statements. This is ac
complished by pairing a company
receiving a “going concern” qualifica
tion with a company having similar
financial ratios, in the same industry,
and receiving an unqualified opinion.
Differences between stock market
reactions of companies receiving “go
ing concern” qualifications and similar
companies receiving unqualified opi
nions were detected. However, the
reaction began five weeks prior to
year-end, well before the release of
the auditor’s report, and continued
thirty weeks after year-end.
The use of financial ratios as a tool
for projecting viability was used in a
classic study by Altman.2 He devel
oped a model that used five ratios in
a single formula derived by multi
variate discriminant analysis (MDA).
This formula could be applied to the
ratios of any single year’s financial
results. His final function was
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4
+ 1.0X5 where

X1 = working capital/total assets

X2 = retained earnings/total assets
X3 = earnings before interest and
taxes/total assets
X4 = market value of equity/book value
of total assets
X5 = sales/total assets

He found that a Z score less than
2.675 indicated that a company’s
financial profile was similar to that of
companies which had failed.
The semi-strong form of the efficient
market hypothesis, asserting that the
prices of securities traded on that
market fully reflect all publicly avail-

able information, has received sub
stantial support in the literature. A
recent study by Lev and Ohlson3
reviews and summarizes previous
market-based accounting research.
Firth4 attempted to investigate the
impact of qualified opinions on inves
tor decisions. He examined the impact
by contrasting the market reactions
toward firms receiving qualified opin
ions with firms in the same industry
that received unqualified opinions. He
found significant differences in the
reactions for firms receiving “going
concern’’ qualifications. The primary
problem with his study is that he did
not control for the market’s response
to the financial statements themselves.
This omission casts serious doubts on
the validity of his findings.

The familiar Market Model has been
used to compute residuals. Many mar
ket studies have used the popular
cumulative-average-residual (CAR)
technique, developed by Fama,
Fisher, Jensen, and Roll,5 of detecting
changes in security price behavior.6

The period for the test described
herein began nine weeks preceding
year-end. Residuals were computed
and the differences in cumulative
average residuals for each pair of
companies were analyzed to see if
they are significantly different from
zero. Differences were tested using
the general paired t-test.7

The Sample
The NAARS data base for 1978 to
1982 was searched for companies re
ceiving their first going concern excep
tion. Twenty-seven companies were
selected. Altman’s Z value was com
puted for each company as a surro
gate for its financial condition at the
time of the audit exception. Then for
each company in the sample, Altman’s
Z was computed for all companies on
Standard and Poor’s Industrial COM
PUSTAT file according to the following
criteria: (1) it must be in the same four
digit SIC code, (2) its year must end
within the same COMPUSTAT year,
and (3) it must be traded on the NYSE
or the ASE. The company with a Z
value closest to the original company
was declared its match, after deter
mining that the match did not receive
a going concern exception. Finally,
security returns for all selected com

TABLE 1
Comparison Of Altman’s Z Values

Exception
Match

Mean

Standard
Deviation

2.35910741
2.21711481

3.11730529
1.46896016

panies were taken from the Center for
Research on Security Prices (CRSP)
daily tapes.
Each of the 27 pairs of companies
in the sample consists of a company
receiving its first going concern excep
tion and its match.
The general t-test was used to com
pare the means of the Z values for the
two groups of companies. Test results
for the entire sample failed to reject
the null hypothesis that the means of
the two groups were significantly dif
ferent; therefore, it is logical to con
clude that the two groups have similar
Z values. This supports the underly
ing premise of the study, that the two
groups are from the same population
based upon their financial statement
characteristics. Moreover, the finan
cial ratios of both groups resemble fail
ed companies.

Results and Conclusions
Results of the t-tests on the dif
ferences between the residuals of the
companies receiving going concern
exceptions and their matches, as illu
strated in Figure 1, indicate that the
stock market did not react the same
to the two types of companies. Resid
uals of zero indicate the security
prices are behaving as expected.
Negative residuals reflect a poorer
than expected performance and posi
tive residuals show a better then
expected performance. Differences
between the residuals became signifi
cantly different from zero about a
month before year-end.

The differences in the residuals
were not significantly different from
zero for the first five weeks of the
period of study. This period was well
after the release of the third quarter
earnings, but before the release of the
year-end information. No information
about either category of company
should normally have been released

T

p-value

0.2141

0.8316

during this period. The reaction occur
ring immediately after this period was
evidently the result of the market’s an
ticipation of the release of the finan
cial statements. Also, leaks about the
going concern qualification may have
begun prior to year-end.
Generally, the match companies
have more internal consistency than
the exception companies, suggesting
that auditors do not base their excep
tions, consistently, on financial
characteristics alone. Except for the
third week before year-end, standard
errors (variances) are higher for the
exception companies and, based
upon that statistic, the samples repre
sent two different populations.

All companies in the experiment ex
hibit worsening performance during
the time period studied as demon
strated by the Residuals graph, Figure
2. However, the performance of those
which received going concern excep
tions worsened significantly more than
that of the companies with matching
financial characteristics but more
favorable auditors’ opinions. These
differences occurred early enough,
however, to suggest that either (1) the
auditor’s opinion is a “non-event,” or
(2) auditors’ evaluations of companies
are quite similar to those of investors.

It is possible that a “going
concern’’ exception is a selffulfilling prophecy.
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FIGURE 1
Graph Of The Differences Using
The Cumulative-Average-Residual Technique

FIGURE 2
Graph Of The Cumulative-Average-Residuals

WEEKS BEFORE AND AFTER YEAR-END
□ EXCEPTION I MATCH
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There were strong downward
movements in the CARs of the excep
tion companies prior to year-end and
another slight downward fluctuation
immediately after year-end, possibly
indicating negative expectations about
the contents of the financial state
ments. On the other hand, the CARs
of the match companies steadily in
creased from about two months prior
to year-end until six weeks afterwards,
indicating increasingly optimistic ex
pectations about the contents of the
financial statements. This suggests
that the uncertainty preceding the
release of the annual report was
greater for the exception companies
than it was for the match companies.
This could have been related to
“leaks” about either the financial con
dition of the companies or the possi
bilities of unfavorable opinions.
Nine weeks after year-end, when
many companies would have released
their financial statements, the CARs of
the match companies receiving “clean”
opinions stabilized at slightly below
zero and remained relatively constant
for the remainder of the period of
study, thus indicating that the stan
dard auditor’s report had no effect on
investor behavior. Figure 2 depicts this
trend. Since the match companies
have financial statements similar to
companies receiving going concern
exceptions, it is not suprising that the
CARs after the release of the financial
statements are negative. This indi
cates that there is some information
content to the financial statements
themselves.
The CARs for companies receiving
going concern exceptions are relative
ly more volatile over time than their
clean opinion counterparts. Although
there was some leveling after week
six, there was considerably more vari
ability over time in the CARs of the ex
ception companies. Also, the residuals
were more negative for the exception
companies, suggesting that investors
were reacting negatively to the con
tents of the annual report. Since the
financial statements of the exception
companies are similar to the financial
statements of the match companies,
the most obvious differences in the
two sets of financial packages is the
auditor’s report. It appears that in
vestors are reacting to the auditor’s
report, or to nonfinancial contrary in
formation upon which the report is

based, rather than simply to the finan
cial statements.
Of course, going concern excep
tions may affect a company’s ability to
obtain additional credit, and investors
may have been reacting to the antici
pation of more restrictive credit. This
returns to the self-fulfilling prophecy
issue. If an investor perceives that a
going concern exception causes dam
age to a company’s credit position by
a greater degree than the financial
statement ratios, this, in turn, will af
fect security price behavior.
Further studies are needed to ex
amine the effect of a going concern
exception on creditors’ decisions.
Would a company that otherwise may
be able to obtain additional debt finan
cing be denied on the basis of a go
ing concern exception? If so, bankers
might need more disclosure with
respect to auditors’ conclusions. In
any event, a going concern exception
does appear to signal increased dif
ficulties in raising capital in the equity
market.Ω
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The Market Model is defined as:
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return of security i in period t.
P’ = The price of security i, adjusted
for dividends, splits and new
offerings, at period t.
P = The price of security i at period t.
 =The intercept and slope of

the linear relationship between R
and R
mt
R
=The return on the market in
mt
period t.
ϵ =The residual or the individual
it

component of the return on
security i in period t.

NOTES
1 American Institute of Certified Public Ac
countants, Statement on Auditing Standards No.
34: The Auditor’s Considerations When a Ques
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(AICPA, 1981).
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7 The paired t-test can be mathematically
stated as:

d
Sd2/n
where:

d = mean difference
S = the standard deviation
d

n = the number of pairs

Betty Brown, Ph.D., CPA, is assistant
professor of accounting at the Univer
sity of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky.
She is a member of the Louisville
Chapter of ASWA, the Kentucky Socie
ty of CPAs, the AICPA and AAA.

Alan Levitan, DBA, CPA, is associate
professor of accounting at the Univer
sity of Louisville in Louisville, Kentucky.
He is a member of the Kentucky Socie
ty of CPAs, the AICPA and AAA.
The Woman CPA, July, 1986/13

